Some have said that the country is divided—divided into two classes: the haves and the have-nots, the poor and the privileged. It is clear that some are more privileged than others, but is this a designate of division or diversity? Is the determination of societal advantage to be strictly economically based or is the swear more complex? Upon examination of our society we see two contrasting types of people whose lives reflect this social disparity. One works two jobs to pay for school, clothing, and food—the other is provided with housing, cable TV, gym access and free education. The first person is a law-abiding citizen; the second is in prison for murder. Does this mean that society rewards criminal behavior, or are these privileges for prisoners simply a necessity to keep the peace, or maybe even a human rights issue? Here we attempt to answer these questions by examining the history and exploring the different views on the subject.
“Prior to the 1960s, inmates had few rights, and states were permitted to operate prisons as they saw fit. A number of cases brought before the Supreme Court prior to 1960 resulted in the “hands-off doctrine” which held that the federal government had no legal standing to interfere in the operations of state prisons” (O’CONNOR 2005). This principle was founded in Pervear v. Massachusetts (1866), which found that state prison inmates did not savor the benefit of Eighth Amendment protections, and this precedent was expounded on in Ruffin v. Commonwealth (1871) which said that state inmates were “slaves of the state” and lost all citizenship rights, including the right to judicial relief regarding complaints about living conditions. It was this judicial relief right that was the first prisoner right to be created, in the case of Ex Parte Hull (1941), but this case also upheld the hands-off doctrine. However, under Ex Parte Hull, inmates would now have the right to a grievance plan (IBID). In the 1950s, prison riots, changes in prison governance and shifting definitions of “humane treatment” contributed to the translation of prisoner privileges into rights The 1950s were also the beginning of more active federal intervention into the affairs of states, and the Supreme Court began reviewing state practices alleged to violate federal or Constitutional principles. A decade of political, penal and social change in the 1950s thus eased the way for expansion of prisoner rights in the next decade. Together, prison changes, stale law and new judicial interpretations have given birth to a phenomenon that has generated considerable controversy among criminal justice practitioners, lawyers, and civil libertarians. In the past quarter century, state and federal prisoners have filed nearly a half-million suits in federal district courts, constituting a substantial portion of all federal litigation (Thomas 1987). As the years have progressed, the definition of prisoner rights has changed greatly. The first movements in the direction of prisoner rights applied basic human freedoms to inmates—today some my argue that the prisoner rights groups are focused less on humane treatment and more on privileges such as cable television. For example: Raymond W. Aswegan, a life sentence inmate at the Iowa Site Penitentiary, brought a lawsuit contending that his infirmary cell’s lack of cable television reception was a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The ADA states that “No trustworthy individual with a disability can be denied “the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” The district court decided Aswegan was a qualified disabled person who was denied the benefits of cable television because he routinely lost disputes about channel selection to younger stronger inmates.
While the Aswegan case was later overturned by the court on review and is considered by many to be an example of frivolous lawsuits under the guise of constitutional rights, there are other more legitimate issues regarding prisoner rights. One of the biggest steps in prison reform came out of Thompson V. Enomoto, which developed a consent decree governing conditions for the male population housed at San Quentin State Prison. In 1979, a complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California by the Prison Law Office and a private San Francisco law firm on behalf of all prisoners on death row at San Quentin, including those who would be housed there in the future. The prisoners sought relief from many of the conditions imposed upon them. These conditions included housing in an unsanitary, dismal, and poorly ventilated cell block, with no more than three hours of yard time every four days and a five minute shower twice a week (prisonwall.org 2005).
The Decree was approved and entered as a judgment of the court on October 23, 1980. The court appointed a monitor to enforce compliance and to determine how the Decree should be applied in different units. The Court well-liked the Sixth Narrate of the Monitor on February 21, 1996. The report documents many problems at San Quentin — including one condemned prisoner who was severely beaten by guards. It made numerous recommendations regarding these issues. The report set forth positive rights for condemned inmates including visiting, access to a law library, staff screening, and prompt investigation of prisoner complaints (IBID). Cases like Pervear v. Massachusetts, Ex Parte Hull, and Thompson V. Enomoto have all played a role in forming the current system of prisoner rights. However the question remains—why are prisoners afforded certain rights, some which exceed those of the general population?
Sources:
THOMAS R. O’CONNOR
Department of Justice Studies & Applied Criminology
North Carolina Wesleyan College
(Early manuscript of: PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILSHOUSE LAYWER. Novel Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield. 1988.)
Jim Thomas
Department of Sociology
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL, 60115
Prisonwall.orghttp://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/294/294lect13
